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Abstract
Firewalls separate areas of different security requirements. This major task leads to problems rea-
garding the network connectivity and performance of various applications. In particular within
distributed systems, like a Grid an unobstructed communication, which is essential for using dis-
tributed ressources is not possible. Furthermore Grid applications often use multiple ports dynam-
ically and in parallel. This raises the challenge of a dynamic configuration of firewalls. Current
solutions are only isolated or proprietary solutions because they only address certain kinds of fire-
wall, e.g. Netfilter and Cisco PIX. This paper describes a solution based on UDP hole punching.
Chapter 1
Firewalls and Grid applications
1.1 Firewalls and filtering of network traffic
Firewalls are used to divide areas of different security policies from each other. The major task
is to prevent computing resources from unauthorized access and misuse. In order to achieve this
task the firewall system processes certain information which is used as a baseline to the forwarding
decision. The firewall administrator defines a ruleset which represents the implementation of the
local security policy. The network traffic is divided into classes of packets which will be forwarded
to the destination or which will be rejected. This ruleset is a baseline to different tests, that will
be applied to each incoming packet. The firewall checks IP addresses and ports of the appropriate
protocol headers. Stateful packet inspection engines use connection states additionally.
Firewalls store state information primarily when a TCP stream is discovered because TCP is a
conection oriented protocol. Half open, established, half closed and closed states differ from each
other. Therefore it is reasonable to differentiate which state a connection has entered. Additionally
TCP is a reliable protocol, i.e. if any TCP segment is lost during transfer a retransmission is trig-
gered due to missing acknowledgements discovered at the sender. Further information can be found
at [St94].
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a non reliable and non connection oriented transport layer
protocol. The application that uses UDP has to make sure that the data is completely transmitted.
Although no connections exist firewalls use a simple mechanism to feign a connection. Figure 1.1
shows a client behind a firewall sending a UDP datagram to a DNS server outside the companies
network.
The client generates the UDP datagram and sends it to the firewall (#1). The firewall examines the
Figure 1.1: Firewalls and UDP
2
1.2. GRID APPLICATIONS AND FIREWALLS 3
datagram and forwards it to the destination (#2). According to the information that has been gath-
ered the firewall adds an entry to its connection table with the parameters source IP address, source
port, destination IP address and destination port. However this results in a dynamic configured
access rule like
allow UDP from 172.30.80.2 port 53 to 10.1.2.2 port 2034
which is valid for a certain configurable period of time. This rule guarantees that as long as the
timeout has not been reached UDP replies from the server (#3) to the client can traverse the firewall
(#4).
Any firewall currently available uses this algorithm to manage UDP connection and to forward
packets that belong to established UDP communications although no connection exists at transport
layer using UDP.
1.2 Grid applications and firewalls
A Grid is a distributed system which makes resources available in form of computing power, storage
capacity and distributed data for its users. It forms an union of geographically distributed, indepen-
dent organizations sometimes referred to as virtual organisations. The usage of available resources
takes place statically or dynamically at run-time according to the requirements of the user and/or
the application.
Grid applications often need high transfer rates and small latencies. Moreover these applications
transfer large data sets which must arrive reliable and as fast as possible at the destination. Another
trait of Grid applications is the dynamic usage of connections in parallel. GridFTP [GridFTP]
can serve as an example here, which mandates that multiple parallel data connections are always
established from the sender to the receiver.
Using multiple data connections demands that firewalls which are located between client and server
know about these data connections. There are two ways to solve this problem. First of all the
firewall can be configured statically, so that certain servers are accessible on well defined port
ranges. Certainly this leads to a high number of unauthorized access probes and enforces a high
level security on the server.
The second way is the dynamic configuration of firewalls and it should satisfy the following de-
mands:
1. It can be integrated smoothly into an existing security concept.
2. It represents a concept, which can be used in open source and in commercial solutions.
3. It permits communication between the partners involved only for the minimum necessary
duration.
The demands above need to be specified more detailed. The first demand guarantees that an ex-
isting security concept keeps valid. Together with the second demand cost-intensive investments
for organizations are to be prevented. The investments are related to possible acquisition of hard-
and/or software and on the new employment and /or further training of personnel. The best way
to go would be to integrate the new solution directly into existing firewall installations. The last
demand is very important, since it is clearly demanded that firewall rules are valid only if the rules
are really used and only as long as they are used.
1.3 Dynamic configuration of firewals
Currently there are different solutions to configure a firewall dynamically. One solution is Cooper-
ative on demand opening (CODO) [Sal05]. It supports interaction with iptables firewalls and works
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with TCP and UDP. Currently CODO was not designed to fit all the particular requirements of a
Grid environment [Val06].
Other solutions are proprietary ones. They are offered by firewall vendors. In general vendors offer
some kind of configuration commands which identify a connection that has to be established before
well defined related traffic is allowed to travers the firewall. The following configuration example is
given for Cisco Secure PIX Firewall Version 7.2. It allows connections from any source IP address
to host 10.1.1.1 on destination port 2811 and allows back connections from TCP ports 20000 to
25000 if a connection on TCP port 2811 is established, see [CP7].
access-list permit tcp any host 10.1.1.1 eq 2811
established tcp 0 2811 permitfrom tcp 20000-25000
Although this seems to be some kind of dynamic configuration there are restrictions to this com-
mand: It allows return access to outbound connections only. This means that inbound connections
to a server cannot be handled by this command. Moreover the establish command does not work
together with port address translation (PAT) which is often used.
This document presents another approach of dynamic configuration of firewalls. It uses a mecha-
nism comparable to UDP hole punching. In computing UDP hole punching refers to a commonly
used NAT traversal technique. NAT traversal through UDP hole punching is a method for establish-
ing bidirectional UDP connections between Internet hosts in private networks using NAT [Sch06].
Chapter 2
UDP hole punching
2.1 UDP Hole Punching
Prerequisite to use UDP hole punching is, that
• the local firewall allows outbound UDP connections
• the local firewall handles UDP connections as streams described in section 1.1.
• a relaying server exists.
The relaying server is a central part of this concept. Each client connects to the relaying server
using a persistent TCP connection. Simultaneously the relaying server gets the IP addresses of the
clients. It does not even matter if any client connects to the public network through a NAT device
because the public IP address is notified.
If the clients want to talk to each other they use a UDP connection. The initiator sends a TCP
segment to the relaying server C, see figure 2.1 (#1). It indicates that client A wants to talk to client
B using a UDP source port, e.g. 4711. The server notifies client B that client A has the public IP
address x.x.x.x and that it expects a UDP connection on port 4711 (#2). Client B sends the preferred
UDP port, e.g. 8822 to the relaying server and simultaneously it sends a UDP datagram from source
port 8822 to destination port 4711 to client A (#3).
Client B’s local firewall forwards the UDP datagram, creates a connection entry and the dynamic
access rule which allows responses to travers the firewall. Client A’s local firewall rejects the packet
but this does not matter at all. The relaying server C informs client A via the existing TCP connec-
tion between A and C that client B is accessible on IP address y.y.y.y and UDP port 8822 (#4).
Client A now sends a UDP datagram from source port 4711 to 8822 (#5). Client A’s local firewall
now creates the dynamic entries. However the dynamic entry in B’s local firewall is still active and
valid, so that the UDP datagram from A to B passes the firewall. Now the communication channel
Figure 2.1: UDP Hole Punching
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is established although the static ruleset of each firewall would normally deny inbound connections
according to the parameters of the protocol headers.
Figure 2.2: UDP hole punching with netcat
The concept of UDP hole punching can easily be shown using netcat. netcat is a networking utility
which reads and writes data across network connections, using the TCP/IP protocol [Nc06]. It is
available on any common linux system. The server resides behind a firewall and listens on port
4711:
server# netcat -u -l -p 4711
Now a client from outside tries to connect to the UDP port 4711 on this server behind the firewall,
see figure 2.2(#1):
client# echo Hello | netcat -p 8822 -u server 4711
This UDP connection is not allowed by the local firewall. The UDP datagram is dropped and
nothing happens. Now the server sends a UDP datagramm to the client outside the firewall and
punches a hole into the firewall (#2):
server# echo Hello | netcat -p 4711 -u client 8822
After that the datagram from client to server is allowed to pass the firewall (#3):
client# echo Hello | netcat -p 8822 -u server 4711
server# netcat -u -l -p 4711
Hello
This simple example works on any common linux system. It can be tested with different firewalls.
In our tests it worked with iptables and Cisco PIX.
Chapter 3
UDP hole punching in Grid
environments
3.1 UDP Hole Punching in Grid environments
The concept of UDP hole punching can be easily modified to be used in Grid environments. The
relaying server is changed to a relaying service. It listens on a TCP connection and waits for user
connections. At connect time user and server that hosts the relaying service may authenticate each
other using X.509 certificates. If the TCP connection between the participants has been established
data transfers can take place as described in section 2.1.
The advantage of a relaying service is obvious. The service resides at the server host. According to
figure 2.1 in section 2.1 relay server C and client B become the same host. Mutual authentication
between client and server is necessary only once at connect time. If the TCP connection is estab-
lished the data transfers are allowed to start. Evenmore there are no problems resulting from NAT.
Any server accessible from the public network is exempted from NAT algorithm and the server only
sees the public IP address of the client.
Often it is useful to transfer data using multiple parallel connections. The client has to indicate how
many connections should be used in parallel. It allocates the sockets and sends the port numbers
to the server. The server reads the information and tries to initiate the maximum number of UDP
connections available by sending small UDP datagrams to the client. This may depend on the
system load. The server sends the local UDP port numbers to the client and the client starts the data
transfers.
A new challenge raises regarding the encryption of UDP data traffic. Secure Socket Layer only
works with TCP as transport protocol. Since UDP is the transport layer protocol in this concept we
need a way to exchange data securely. The applicable algorithm is Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
[Sch96]. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm cannot be used to encrypt or decrypt data but it is used
for key distribution. Server and client are able to derive a key from the chosen Diffie-Hellman
parameters. This key could be used to encrypt the data. Moreover it would be useful to declare the
encryption of the data transfer as an optional feature. Because data is not always confidential this
could speed up the transfer.
Another approach to encrypt the transferred data could be a simple symmetric algorithm. Because
the TCP connection between client and server is secured via X.509 certificates the exchange of a
shared secret could be done via this channel.
The second challenge raises regarding the requirements of Grid applications. Data transfers should
be fast and reliable. Because UDP has no three-way-handshake and no acknowledgements it is
faster than TCP, but UDP is not reliable. Each UDP datagram is an instance of its own and the
application has to make sure that all the data has arrived. In fact this means that Grid applications
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have to be changed. They have to use UDP and need an instance to implement reliability.
An alternativ to UDP is the UDP-based Data Transfer Protocol (UDT). UDT uses UDP as transport
protocol but it guarantees reliability in upper layer headers. Of course Grid applications have to be
modified also, but the effort is very small because an API using UDT can be provided. Only
signatures of subroutines allocating sockets have to be changed. The following section describes
UDT in general.
3.2 UDP-based Data Transfer Protocol (UDT)
Like TCP, UDP is a transport layer protocol. Besides the data payload UDP packets only consist
of a minimal header containing information about source and destination port, packet length and
a checksum. In contrast to TCP, in a UDP header there are neither flags or control bits nor any
sequence or acknowledgment numbers. For that reason the protocol itself is not able to read a con-
nection state from a packet. Additionally it cannot recognize or interpret packet loss. Therefore
TCP features relating to a reliable and fair protocol such as establishing or tearing down a connec-
tion, buffering packets for a resend after loss and avoiding congestion have to be implemented at
higher levels.
UDT is such an implementation. UDT is not a protocol of the transport layer like TCP or UDP. It
utilizes UDP as transport protocol and provides reliable communication and congestion control on
application layer, thus completely in user space.
There have been several earlier approaches to this concept, like RBUDP or TSUNAMI, but currently
UDT appears to be the most actively maintained project.
UDT is open source and distributed under the LGPL. It is designed and implemented by the Na-
tional Center for Data Mining at the University of Illinois at Chicago. A first internet draft has
been released in August 2004 [Udt04]. The latest stable release including documentation can be
downloaded from Sourceforge [Udt06].
The UDT specific implementation for reliability and congestion control is realised as follows:
• Reliability is done by sequencing and acknowledgment. Each UDT packet is assigned a
unique increasing sequence number. The receiver will send back acknowledgments and loss
reports according to packet arrival. So lost packets will be retransmitted.
• Congestion control: unlike TCP the approach is not window but rate based, meaning that
the algorithm does not open up the sender’s congestion window, in fact it reduces the inter-
packet delay of sent out packets, thus increasing its sending rate. Congestion avoidance uses
a special case of the AIMD (Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease) algorithm; it reduces
the increase when getting close to the estimated link bandwith.
Besides its own congestion control algorithm UDT can also utilize external or custom congestion
control algorithms like TCP Reno or TCP BIC congestion control.
From a programmer’s point of view UDT provides a C++ API with a semantic analogue to the TCP
sockets (see figure 3.2).
• In existing applications almost all TCP socket calls can be replaced 1:1 with socket calls
from the UDT namespace. To use UDT instead of TCP insert the line #include <udt.h>
in your source code, replace all socket calls xxx() with UDT::xxx(), recompile and link the
udt-library.
• For new applications: Just use udt.h instead of socket.h. For example a typical client server
sequence would then look like:
For the client:
#include <udt.h>
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Figure 3.1: TCP and UDT sockets
UDT::socket()
UDT::connect()
UDT::recv() or UDT::send()
For the server:
#include <udt.h>
UDT::socket()
UDT::bind()
UDT::listen()
UDT::accept()
Custom congestion control is provided by a class CCC. The application can use UDT::setsockopt()
or UDT::getsockopt() to assign this control class to a UDT instance, and/or set its parameters.
Example:
UDT::setsockopt(usock, 0, UDT CC, new CCCFactory<CTCP>, sizeof(CCCFactory<CTCP>))
The above code assigns the CTCP control algorithm to a UDT socket usock, meaning that this
instance would use (and behave like) TCP Reno congestion control (NB: utilizing UDP underneath).
For further examples, a tutorial and a full list of all UDT functions and references please read the
UDT manual [Udt06].
3.3 The overall design
After the concept of UDP hole punching has been described and modified for the usage in Grid
environments in the previous sections, the overall design of the concept will be explained shortly.
Figure 3.2: UDP hole punching in Grid environments
The Grid client application at host A connects to the server host B at a predefined port number
e.g. 4711 via A’s local firewall and the remote firewall at B’s location (#1). The specified port
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has to be opened at any firewall for every host which provides this relaying service. After mutual
authentication using X.509 certificates has been done successfully, data exchange using dynamic
ports can take place.
Client A and Server B exchange securely authentication and authorization information as well as
key information for a later secure comunication with the required service on this host (any grid
application, AGA) (#2).
The relaying service informs the AGA service on host B locally that host A wants to connect to
servce AGA via e.g. UDP port 32666 (#3). AGA looks for a free port number e.g 35678. Then
AGA sends a UDP packet to host A at port 32666 and uses as source port 35678 (#4). The packet
traverses host B’s firewallbecause outgoing UDP packets are allowed, but gets rejected at host A’s
firewall. Nevertheless host B’s firewall assumes a ”UDP stream¨between A/32666 and B/35678.
After the first UDP datagram has sent from host B to host A, host B’s AGA now informs host B’s
relaying service about the port to be used as destination by A (#5). The relaying service informs
host A via the initial open TCP connection that AGA is waiting for UDP communication at port
35678 (#6).
Now host A connects to service AGA on host B with the agreed UDP port 35678 and uses as
source port 32666 (#7). Hosts A and B are now able to use the UDP-based Data Transfer protocol
(UDT) via the established communication path (also #7). The firewall has been opened securely
and dynamically without any firewall modifications.
3.4 Summary
Firewalls are absolute essential devices to improve the local security of an organisation. Although
their necessity is proved they lead to problems regarding network connectivity and performance.
Grid applications are affected by firewalls because they need high performance and low latencies.
More often they use multiple connections in parallel to speed up the data transfer. To fit this re-
quirement of Grid applications static port ranges are configured on firewalls. Currently this is the
only solution but it leads to unauthorized accesses to sensitive resources. Dynamic configuration
would ease this problem.
This paper introduced a possible solution which configures a firewall dynamically based on UDP
hole punching. The concept is modified and adjusted to the needs of Grid environments.
An application programming interface has to be created which realizes the concept introduced here.
Probably this solution can be easily integrated in current Grid applications. The well known and
widely distributed middleware UNICORE as an example could be improved to use multiple data
connections.
The described concept of Grid UDP hole punching can be seen as a further step in providing solu-
tions for Grid applications dealing with existing firewalls. It can be easily used by most of the Grid
applications known today to overcome time delays until “real” dynamic configurable firewalls are
available on the market.
Bibliography
[CP7] Cisco System, Inc.
Cisco Security Appliance Command Reference
For the Cisco ASA 5500 Series and Cisco PIX 500 Series, Software Version 7.2.(1), Text Part
Number: OL-10086-01
Cisco Systems 2006
[GridFTP] GT4.0 GridFTP, Globus Toolkit website
http://www.globus.org/toolkit/docs/4.0/data/gridftp, August 2006
[Nc06] The GNU Netcat project
http://netcat.sourceforge.net/, Augusat 2006
[RFC959] RFC 959
File Transfer Protocol
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc959.txt?number=959
[Sal05] S. Son, B. Allcock, M. Livny
CODO: Firewall Traversal by Cooperative On-Demand Opening
14th IEEE Symposium on High Performance Distributed Computing (HPDC14), Research
Triangle Park, July 2005
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/ sschang/papers/CODO-hpdc.pdf
[Sch96] B. Schneier
Applied Cryptography Second Edition: protocols, algorithms, and cource code in C
Wiley, 1996
[Sch06] J. Schmidt
Der Lochtrick - Wie Skype & Co. Firewalls umgehen
Heise Verlag, C’T 2006, Heft 17, pp. 142 ff
[St94] W. Richard Stevens
TCP/IP Illustrated I. The Protocols.
Addison Wesley 1994
[Udt04] Y. Gu, R.L. Grossmann
UDT: A transport protocol for data intesive applications
Internet Draft, draft-gg-udt-01.txt
University of Illinois at Chicago, August 2004
[Udt06] Y. Gu
UDT: UDP-based data transfer library - Version 3
http://www.cs.uic.edu/∼ygu1/, May 2006
[Val06] G.L Volpato, Ch. Grimm
Practical Tests and Experiences with CODO
D-Grid project work paper, July 2006
11
